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CASE NOTE
PUBLIC LAND LAW—Looking into the Future: The Need for a Final Judgment
on the Validity of the Roadless Rule, Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 414
F.3d 1207 (10th Cir. 2005).
Cortney Hill Kitchen*
INTRODUCTION
The future of national forest roadless areas is uncertain.1 Since 2001, litigation
has surrounded national forest roadless area management.2 Courts render a
judgment on the issue, only to have an opposite judgment issued by another
court.3 Although one may know today what the management plan for national
forest roadless areas is, courts have continually quashed hopes for a long-term
plan and the ability to predict the future of roadless areas.4 Also, two presidential
administrations with different views on roadless area management increased the
* University of Wyoming College of Law J.D. Candidate, 2009.
1

See generally Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 414 F.3d 1207, 1214 (10th Cir. 2005)
[hereinafter Wyoming II] (holding the Roadless Rule case to be moot); Kootenai Tribe v. Veneman,
313 F.3d 1094, 1123 (9th Cir. 2002) [hereinafter Kootenai II] (holding the district court erroneously
granted a preliminary injunction of the Roadless Rule); Cal. ex rel. Lockyer v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric.,
459 F. Supp. 2d 874, 919 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (holding the State Petitions Rule is to be set aside,
reinstating the Roadless Rule); Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 277 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1239 (D.
Wyo. 2003) [hereinafter Wyoming I] (holding the Roadless Rule invalid, thus granting a permanent
nationwide injunction of the rule); Kootenai Tribe v. Veneman, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1248 (D.
Idaho 2001) [hereinafter Kootenai I] (holding a likelihood of success on claims, thus granting a
preliminary injunction of the Roadless Rule).
2

See Wyoming II, 414 F.3d 1207; Kootenai II, 313 F.3d 1094; Lockyer, 459 F. Supp. 2d 874;
Wyoming I, 277 F. Supp. 2d 1197; Kootenai I, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1231.
3

Compare Wyoming I, 277 F. Supp. 2d at 1239 (holding the roadless rule violated NEPA, thus
granting a permanent nationwide injunction on the rule) and Kootenai I, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1248
(granting a preliminary injunction on the Roadless Rule because court found a likelihood of success
on NEPA claims and of irreparable harm), with Kootenai II, 313 F.3d at 1123 (ﬁnding Kootenai I
erroneously granted a preliminary injunction based on the faulty assumption of likelihood of success
of NEPA claim and ﬁnding of irreparable harm), and Lockyer, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 919 (repealing
the State Petitions Rule and reinstating nationwide the Roadless Rule); see also Felicity Barringer,
Judge Voids Bush Policy on National Forest Roads, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2006 at A21(describing the
national forest management litigation as “legal Ping-Pong”).
4

See generally Wyoming II, 414 F.3d 1207 (mooting the Roadless Rule case); Kootenai II, 313
F.3d at 1123 (reversing Kootenai I’s preliminary injunction of the Roadless Rule); Lockyer, 459 F.
Supp. 2d at 919 (repealing the State Petitions Rule and reinstating the Roadless Rule nationwide);
Wyoming I, 277 F. Supp. 2d at 1239 (granting a nationwide injunction of the Roadless Rule);
Kootenai I, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1248 (holding the Roadless Rule likely violated NEPA, granting a
preliminary injunction of the rule); see also Robert L. Glicksman, Traveling in Opposite Directions:
Roadless Area Management Under the Clinton and Bush Administrations, 34 ENVTL. L. 1143, 1185
(2004) (“While the Ninth Circuit held that the Forest Service fully complied with NEPA [National
Environmental Policy Act] in its promulgation of the Roadless Rule, the Wyoming district court
found several deﬁciencies in the agency’s efforts to comply with NEPA.”); see infra note 199.
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uncertainty surrounding these areas.5 One administration assured national, longterm protection of roadless areas, while the next sought state-by-state protection,
which would allow for varying degrees of protection.6 Without a long-term
plan, the U.S. Forest Service (Forest Service) and states lack the ability to assure
preservation of this ﬁnite resource.7
The decisions sparking litigation over national forest roadless area management
began almost ten years ago.8 In March 1999, after years of forest-by-forest
management plans, the Forest Service placed a moratorium on road construction
in inventoried national forest roadless areas.9 During the moratorium, President
Clinton directed the Forest Service to develop a new management policy for
roadless areas.10 The Forest Service commenced the public process to establish
new Forest Service regulations.11 This process, in compliance with the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), included a Draft Environmental Impact
Statement (DEIS) and a proposed rule, both of which were published in May
2000.12 After the public comment period, the Forest Service published a Final
Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) in November 2000.13 In January 2001,
5
Glicksman, supra note 4, at 1208 (“[T]he direction in which the Bush Administration is
steering roadless area management policy is very different from the direction reﬂected in the Roadless
Rule and associated Clinton Administration initiatives: [President Bush’s] direction is aligned less
with natural resource preservation and more with resource extraction and development.”).
6

See, e.g., Glicksman, supra note 4, at 1143-44; compare Special Areas; Roadless Area
Conservation, 66 Fed. Reg. 3244 (Jan. 12, 2001) (to be codiﬁed at 36 C.F.R. pt. 294) [hereinafter
Roadless Area Conservation] (mandating a nationwide conservation of national forest roadless
areas), with Special Areas; State Petitions for Inventoried Roadless Area Management, 70 Fed. Reg.
25654, 25661 (May 13, 2005) (to be codiﬁed at 36 C.F.R. pt. 294) [hereinafter State Petitions]
(mandating a state-by-state approach to national forest roadless areas, which would allow for varied
levels of protection between states and even within a state).
7
The Forest Service through “[t]he Secretary of Agriculture shall make provisions for the
protection against destruction by ﬁre and depredations upon the public forests and national
forests.” Protection of National Forests; Rules and Regulations, 16 U.S.C. § 551 (2006). The
courts’ indecisiveness greatly affects Wyoming, a state with an abundance of national forest land.
Wyoming II, 414 F.3d at 1211. Approximately 3.25 million acres (35%) of the national forest land
in Wyoming is roadless as deﬁned by Roadless Area Review Evaluation II. Id.
8
See Administration of the Forest Development Transportation System: Temporary Suspension
of Road Construction and Reconstruction in Unroaded Areas, 64 Fed. Reg. 7,290 (Feb. 12, 1999)
(to be codiﬁed at 36 C.F.R. pt. 212).
9
Id. (“This ﬁnal interim rule temporarily suspends decisionmaking regarding road construction
and reconstruction in many unroaded areas within the National Forest System.”); see also Wyoming
I, 277 F. Supp. 2d at 1205-06 (granting a moratorium allowed “time to assess the ecological,
economic, and social value of roadless areas and to evaluate the long-term management options for
inventoried roadless areas.”).
10

Wyoming I, 277 F. Supp. at 1205-06.

11

Wyoming II, 414 F.3d at 1210.

12

National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (2006); Wyoming II, 414 F.3d
at 1210.
13

Wyoming II, 414 F.3d at 1210.
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the Forest Service adopted the Roadless Rule.14 The Roadless Rule prohibited
road construction activities and timber harvesting in inventoried national forest
roadless areas, unless the activity fell into one of the enumerated exceptions.15
Criticism of the Roadless Rule and the Forest Service quickly developed.16
Four months after the Forest Service adopted the Roadless Rule, the State of
Wyoming ﬁled suit against the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)
for procedural and substantive deﬁciencies.17 Wyoming asked the U.S. District
Court for the District of Wyoming (district court) for declaratory and injunctive
relief from the Roadless Rule.18 Wyoming claimed the Forest Service violated
NEPA, the Wilderness Act, and other acts when promulgating the Roadless
Rule.19 The district court found for Wyoming on ﬁve of its NEPA claims and
its Wilderness Act claim.20 The court ordered a nationwide injunction of the
Roadless Rule.21

14

Id.; see Roadless Area Conservation, 66 Fed. Reg. 3244-01 (Jan. 12, 2001) (to be codiﬁed
at 36 C.F.R. pt. 294).
15

See Roadless Area Conservation, 66 Fed. Reg. at 3272 (“A road may not be constructed or
reconstructed in inventoried roadless areas of the National Forest System . . . . Timber may not be
cut, sold, or removed in inventoried roadless areas of the National Forest System.”); see also Wyoming
II, 414 F.3d at 1210; see infra note 53 and accompanying text (listing the exceptions).
16

Wyoming II, 414 F.3d at 1211.

17

Id. (alleging the Roadless Rule violated NEPA and the Wilderness Act); see infra notes 15358 and accompanying text. The USDA oversees the Forest Service. See Charles L. Kaiser & Scott W.
Hardt, Fitting Oil and Gas Development Into the Multiple-Use Framework: A New Role for the Forest?,
62 U. COLO. L. REV. 827, 832 (1991).
18

Wyoming II, 414 F.3d at 1211.

19

See id.; see also National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (2006);
National Wilderness Preservation System Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (2006). Although the court
recognized the Kootenai II decision, which held the Roadless Rule was unlikely to violate NEPA,
the court gave no deference to the decision. Wyoming II, 414 F.3d at 1210 n.1. The court found
the Kootenai II decision “to be of limited persuasive value” for three reasons: (1) the decision may
have overruled other Ninth Circuit opinions concerning NEPA, (2) the opinion departed from
U.S. Supreme Court NEPA precedent by discussing substantive components of NEPA, and (3)
the opinion failed to clarify what it overruled. Id. In contrast, Lockyer asserted the Ninth Circuit’s
Kootenai II opinion “explained in considerable detail its conclusion” that the promulgation of the
Roadless Rule likely did not violate NEPA. Cal. ex rel. Lockyer v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 459 F. Supp.
2d 874, 880-81 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
20

Wyoming I, 277 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1239 (D. Wyo. 2003).

21

Id. The Northern District of California explained an injunction is generally the remedy for
NEPA violations. Lockyer, 468 F. Supp. 2d at 913. Additionally, the injunction should be “tailored to
the violation of the law that the [c]ourt already found—an injunction that is no broader but also no
narrower than necessary to remedy violations of NEPA.” Cal. ex rel. Lockyer v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric.,
468 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1144 (N.D. Cal. 2006). The court further elaborated that the injunction
must “prevent such injury from occurring again by the operation of the invalidated regulations, be it
in the Eastern District of California . . . or anywhere else in the nation.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus,
the court explained the proper remedy for a national rule that violates NEPA can be a nationwide
injunction. See id.
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The USDA did not appeal the district court’s decision, but environmental
organizations, intervenors in the suit, appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals.22 Concurrently, however, the new administration was taking steps to
replace the Roadless Rule.23 Under the direction of President Bush, the Forest
Service announced an interim rule for national forest roadless area management,
while it developed a new management plan.24 In May 2005, the Forest Service
replaced the Roadless Rule with the State Petitions Rule.25 The State Petitions
Rule allows state governors to petition the Secretary of Agriculture to establish
state management practices for national forest roadless areas within the state’s
boundaries.26
Because the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found the Roadless Rule no
longer existed, it held the case was moot.27 To preserve the petitioners’ rights the
Tenth Circuit vacated the lower court’s decision.28

22

See Wyoming II, 414 F.3d at 1211. Intervenors included the Wyoming Outdoor Council; the
Wilderness Society; Sierra Club; Biodiversity Associates; Paciﬁc Rivers Council; Natural Resources
Defense Council; Defenders of Wildlife; National Audubon Society. Id. at 1207. There were
also twenty amici curiae, which included environmental groups, mining associations, petroleum
associations, states, and counties. Id.
23
Id. at 1211 (“While the appeal [Wyoming II] was pending, the Forest Service announced a
proposal to replace the Roadless Rule.”).
24
Id.; see also Roadless Area Protection, 69 Fed. Reg. 42648-02 (July 16, 2004) (“The reinstated
[interim directive] . . . is intended to provide guidance for addressing road and timber management
activities in inventoried roadless areas until land and resource management plans are amended or
revised.”).
25

Wyoming II, 414 F.3d at 1211.

26

Id.

27

Id. at 1211-13. The court stated that the “portions of the Roadless Rule that were substantively
challenged by Wyoming no longer exist . . . . Moreover, the alleged procedural deﬁciencies of
the Roadless Rule are now irrelevant because the replacement rule was promulgated in a new and
separate rulemaking process.” Id. at 1212. The court determined the announcement of the State
Petitions Rule removed both the substantive and procedural challenges to the Roadless Rule, making
the case on appeal moot. See id.
28

Id. at 1213-14. Following Tenth Circuit and Supreme Court precedent, once the court
determined the case to be moot, it vacated the lower court’s decision. Id. at 1213. Vacating a
judgment “is commonly utilized . . . to prevent a judgment, unreviewable because of mootness,
from spawning any legal consequences.” U.S. v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 41 (1950). The
U.S. Supreme Court further explained how parties’ rights are protected through vacatour by stating
“that those who have been prevented from obtaining the review to which they are entitled should
not be treated as if there had been a review.” Id. at 39. When an appeals court moots a case and
then vacates the lower court’s decision “the rights of all parties are preserved; none is prejudiced by
a decision which in the statutory scheme was only preliminary.” Id. at 40. The court in Wyoming II
stated that “the rights of the defendant-intervenors, the nonprevailing parties seeking appellate relief,
are preserved” by vacating the lower court’s judgment. Wyoming II, 414 F.3d at 1213 n.6 (emphasis
added).
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This case note argues the Tenth Circuit in Wyoming II erroneously decided
the case to be moot.29 This note analyzes the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals’
decision, arguing the court should have employed a recognized exception to the
mootness doctrine, public interest, and judicial economy to rule on the merits
of the case.30 Furthermore, this note reviews the two opposing national forest
roadless area management rules and recent cases, which challenged roadless area
management plans, to defend its position.31

BACKGROUND
In 1897, the Forest Service Organic Act (Organic Act) instituted the ﬁrst
management plan for national forest land.32 Recently, however, national forests,
especially roadless areas, have lacked a steady management plan because of
administrative and judicial ﬂip-ﬂopping.33 The Tenth Circuit added to the
inconsistent management by failing to rule on the merits of the Roadless Rule.34
Reviewing the history of national forest roadless area management, relevant
cases, and the mootness doctrine helps to understand why the Tenth Circuit
should have ruled on the merits of the Roadless Rule.35 The recent vacillation of
national forest roadless area management demonstrates the controversial nature of
the issue and also the need for a long-term management plan.36 A Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals decision and a U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California decision illustrate the same vacillation, but in the judicial context.37
Finally, an examination of the mootness doctrine reveals an exception applicable
to Wyoming II.38
29

See infra notes 145-94 and accompanying text.

30

See infra notes 145-94 and accompanying text.

31

See infra notes 39-99 and accompanying text.

32

Kaiser & Hardt, supra note 17, at 830-31; see Forest Service Organic Act, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 473-478, 489-482, 551 (2006).
33
Compare Wyoming I, 277 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1239 (D. Wyo. 2003) (holding the roadless
rule violated NEPA, thus granting a permanent nationwide injunction on the rule) and Kootenai
I, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1248 (D. Idaho 2001) (granting a preliminary injunction on the Roadless
Rule because court found a likelihood of success on NEPA claims and of irreparable harm), with
Kootenai II, 313 F.3d 1094, 1123 (9th Cir. 2002) (ﬁnding Kootenai I erroneously granted a
preliminary injunction based on the faulty assumption of likelihood of success of NEPA claim and
ﬁnding of irreparable harm), and Cal. ex rel. Lockyer v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 459 F. Supp. 2d 874,
919 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (repealing the State Petitions Rule and reinstating nationwide the Roadless
Rule); see also Barringer, supra note 3, at A21 (describing the national forest management litigation
as “legal Ping-Pong”).
34

See Wyoming II, 414 F.3d 1207, 1214 (10th Cir. 2005).

35

See infra notes 39-120 and accompanying text.

36

See infra notes 39-68 and accompanying text.

37

See infra notes 69-99 and accompanying text.

38

See infra notes 100-120 and accompanying text.
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A. Management Plans for National Forest Roadless Areas
Until the promulgation of the Roadless Rule, the Forest Service offered no
uniform plan for national forest roadless area management.39 Instead, “individual
forest plans governed the use of roadless areas . . . [and there was] forest-by-forest
decision making.”40 Often the Forest Service bowed to industrial interests in forest
plans, allowing industrial logging in roadless areas and the infrastructure needed
to support such operations.41 As concern for the degradation of roadless areas
rose, a national mandate to protect this ﬁnite resource was inevitable.42
Recognizing the importance of roadless areas, the Forest Service issued an
interim national forest management rule in 1999.43 The interim rule mandated an
eighteen-month moratorium on road construction in roadless areas identiﬁed by
the second Roadless Area Review and Evaluation.44 The Forest Service used this
eighteen-month period to analyze the “beneﬁts and impacts of roads.”45 During
this period, Congress required the Forest Service to prepare an Environmental
Impact Statement (EIS).46 The Forest Service used the EIS as a guide to create a

39

See Cal. ex rel. Lockyer v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 459 F. Supp. 2d 874, 880 (N.D. Cal. 2006).

40

Id.

41

Cf. Kootenai II, 313 F.3d 1094, 1105 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that in twenty years the Forest
Service developed (built roads, logged, etc.) 2.8 million acres of national forest roadless areas).
42

See Heather S. Fredrikson, The Roadless Rule that Never Was: Why Roadless Areas Should be
Protected Through National Forest Planning Instead of Agency Rulemaking, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 457,
464 (2006). From 1970 to 1990 the Forest Service adopted a “commodity production” policy, thus,
timber and energy companies became keenly interested in road construction in national forests.
Id. Conservationists and the Clinton administration voiced their concern over such practices in
national forest inventoried roadless areas. Id.
43

See Wyo. Timber Indus. Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 80 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1249 (D. Wyo.
2000) (“In particular, the Forest Service was concerned with funding shortfalls, erosion and other
environmental damage, substandard roads, and the value of unroaded areas”); see also Administration
of the Forest Development Transportation System: Temporary Suspension of Road Construction
and Reconstruction in Unroaded Areas, 64 Fed. Reg. 7,290 (Feb. 12, 1999) (to be codiﬁed at
36 C.F.R. pt. 212) (“This ﬁnal interim rule temporarily suspends decisionmaking regarding road
construction and reconstruction in many unroaded areas within the National Forest System.”).
44
See Administration of the Forest Development Transportation System: Temporary
Suspension of Road Construction and Reconstruction in Unroaded Areas, 64 Fed. Reg. at 7,290
(“The temporary suspension of road construction and reconstruction will expire upon the adoption
of a revised road management policy or 18 months from the effective date of this ﬁnal interim rule,
whichever is sooner.”); see, e.g., Wyo. Timber Indus., 80 F. Supp. 2d at 1249. In 1979, the second
Roadless Area Review and Evaluation (RARE II) identiﬁed 2,919 national forest roadless areas
and recommended the appropriate future management for each. Mountain States Legal Found. v.
Andrus, 499 F. Supp. 383, 387 (D. Wyo. 1980) (estimating the roadless areas included more than
sixty-two million acres).
45

Wyo. Timber Indus., 80 F. Supp. 2d at 1249.

46

See H. Micheal Anderson & Aliki Moncrief, America’s Unprotected Wilderness, 76 DENV. U.
L. REV. 413, 436 (1999).
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new rule for national forest roadless area management.47 In May 2000, the Forest
Service published the DEIS and the proposed rule, allowing public comment
until July 2000.48 The Forest Service then issued the FEIS in November of 2000.49
The FEIS subjected 58.5 million acres to the Roadless Rule, including 4.2 million
acres of roadless area previously not included in the DEIS.50 Finally, on January
5, 2001, the Forest Service announced the ﬁnal Roadless Rule, which would be
implemented in March of the same year.51
The Roadless Rule prohibited all forms of road construction in inventoried
national forest roadless areas unless the construction fell into one of four
enumerated exceptions.52 Road construction was allowed under the Roadless Rule
if it was (1) for the protection of public health and safety, (2) needed for statutory
environmental cleanup, (3) a right reserved in a statute or treaty, or (4) necessary
for established mineral leases.53 The Roadless Rule’s extensive ban on road
construction and its national scope “were necessary to protect the diminishing
areas of relatively unspoiled national forest from further fragmentation by the
steady accretion of local decisions allowing encroachment.”54

47

See id.

48

Wyoming II, 414 F.3d 1207, 1210 (10th Cir. 2005); see also Special Areas; Roadless Area
Conservation; Proposed Rules, 65 Fed. Reg. 30275 (May 10, 2000) (to be codiﬁed at 36 C.F.R.
294).
49

Wyoming I, 277 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1206-10 (D. Wyo. 2003).

50

Kootenai II, 313 F.3d 1094, 1105 (9th Cir. 2002).

51

Id.; see also Roadless Area Conservation, 66 Fed. Reg. 3244 (Jan. 12, 2001) (to be codiﬁed
at 36 C.F.R. pt. 294).
52

Wyoming I, 277 F. Supp. 2d at 1210.

53

Id.

54

Cal. ex rel. Lockyer v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 459 F. Supp. 2d 874, 880 (N.D. Cal. 2006). In
December 2003, the Department of Agriculture amended the Roadless Rule to include the Tongass
Amendment. Special Areas; Roadless Area Conservation; Applicability to the Tongass National
Forest, Alaska, 68 Fed. Reg. 75136-01 (Dec. 30, 2003) (to be codiﬁed at 36 C.F.R. 294). The
Tongass Amendment “temporarily exempt[ed] the Tongass National Forest . . . from prohibitions
against timber harvest, road construction, and reconstruction in inventoried roadless areas . . . until
the Department promulgate[d] a subsequent ﬁnal rule concerning the application of the roadless
rule within the State of Alaska.” Id. at 75136. The amendment spurs from the settlement of a
lawsuit between the State of Alaska and the USDA. Id. at 75137. Impetus for the rule comes from
the two facts: (1) many communities in southeast Alaska are surrounded by Tongass roadless areas,
thus prohibiting roads would limit the access to these communities; and (2) the majority of people
in these communities rely on timber harvesting in the Tongass for work, losing this would cause
a huge detriment to the economy of southeast Alaska. Id. “The November 2000 [F]EIS for the
roadless rule estimated that a total of approximately 900 jobs could be lost in the long run in
Southeast Alaska due to the application of the roadless rule, including direct job losses in the timber
industry as well as indirect job losses in other sectors.” Id.
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The Roadless Rule, however, did not go into effect in March 2001 as planned.55
When President Bush took ofﬁce, he suspended the Roadless Rule and other
actions not yet implemented by the previous administration.56 The suspension
allowed the Bush administration “the opportunity to review any new or pending
regulations.”57 In May 2001, when the suspension was almost over, the U.S.
District Court for the District of Idaho preliminarily enjoined implementation of
the Roadless Rule.58 The Roadless Rule ﬁnally went into effect in April 2003 when
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the preliminary injunction.59 The
Roadless Rule, however, was in effect only three months before the U.S. District
Court for the District of Wyoming declared a national, permanent injunction on
the rule.60 Subsequently, the Forest Service replaced the Roadless Rule with the
State Petitions Rule in May 2005.61
The State Petitions Rule revoked the national management plan for national
forest roadless areas and installed a system for state-by-state management of these
lands.62 The State Petitions Rule allows a governor to petition the Secretary of
Agriculture to establish management plans for all or portions of national forest
roadless areas within the state’s borders.63 The petition “must include speciﬁc
information and recommendations on the management requirements for individual
inventoried roadless areas within that particular State.”64 The State Petitions Rule

55
Lockyer, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 880; see also Roadless Area Conservation, 66 Fed. Reg. 3244
(Jan. 12, 2001).
56

Lockyer, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 880; see Memorandum for the Heads and Acting Heads of
Executive Departments and Agencies [hereinafter Memorandum], 66 Fed. Reg. 7702 (Jan. 24,
2001) (“With respect to regulations that have been published in the [Federal Resister] but have not
taken effect, temporarily postpone the effective date of the regulations for 60 days.”).
57

Memorandum, 66 Fed. Reg. 7702; see also Fredrikson, supra note 42, at 464.

58

See Kootenai I, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1248 (D. Idaho 2001) (holding a likelihood of success
on claims, thus granting a preliminary injunction of the Roadless Rule); see infra notes 72-74 and
accompanying text; see also Lockyer, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 880.
59
See Kootenai II, 313 F.3d 1094, 1126 (9th Cir. 2002) (concluding the preliminary injunction
was incorrectly issued); see infra notes 80-84 and accompanying text; see also Lockyer, 459 F. Supp.
2d at 918.
60
See Wyoming I, 277 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1239 (D. Wyo. 2003) (granting a nationwide
injunction of the Roadless Rule).
61
See Wyoming II, 414 F.3d 1207, 1211 (10th Cir. 2005); State Petitions, 70 Fed. Reg. 25654
(May 13, 2005) (to be codiﬁed at 36 C.F.R. pt. 294).
62

See State Petitions, 70 Fed. Reg. 25654 (“[M]anagement requirements for inventoried roadless
areas [will] be guided by individual land management plans until and unless these management
requirements are changed through a State-speciﬁc rulemaking.”); see also Cal. ex rel. Lockyer v. U.S.
Dep’t of Agric., 459 F. Supp. 2d 874, 881 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
63

State Petitions, 70 Fed. Reg. at 25661.

64

Id. at 25655. The State Petitions Rule continued by stating if a state submits a petition for
a national forest roadless area and the area extends into another state, the petitioning governor
“should coordinate with the Governor of the adjacent State.” Id.
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allows governors to ﬁle petitions within eighteen months of the Rule’s inception.65
The Secretary and an advisory committee then evaluate the petition.66 The life
of the State Petitions Rule, like the Roadless Rule, was short.67 On October 11,
2006, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California set aside the
State Petitions Rule and reinstated the Roadless Rule nationwide.68

B. Recent Cases Addressing National Forest Roadless Area Management Plans
Just three days after the Forest Service issued the Roadless Rule, the Kootenai
Tribe ﬁled a claim challenging the Roadless Rule.69 The Tribe claimed the Roadless
Rule violated NEPA and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).70 Just one
day later, the State of Idaho ﬁled a similar complaint in the same court.71 The
U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho granted both plaintiffs’ request for
a preliminary injunction of the Roadless Rule.72 The court found the plaintiffs
presented “a strong likelihood of success on the merits” of their NEPA claims.73
The court also found the plaintiffs presented sufﬁcient information to show the
Roadless Rule was likely to cause irreversible harm to national forests.74 Although
the Forest Service did not appeal the injunction, intervening environmental
organizations did.75

65

Id.

66

Id. The advisory committee was a national committee established to address the concerns
that management of roadless areas have national implications. Id. The committee was composed of
people concerned with the conservation and management of national forest roadless areas. Id.
67

Lockyer, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 919.

68

Id. Prior to its repeal, eleven States submitted petitions pursuant to the State Petitions Rule. Red
Lodge Clearinghouse, National Forest Management, available at http://www.redlodgeclearinghouse.
org/legislation/ nationalforestmanagement2.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2007). States submitting
petitions were CA, CO, ID, ME, MI, NC, NM, OR, SC, VA, WA. Id.
69

Kootenai I, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1231 (D. Idaho 2001).

70

Id. at 1236; see also National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (2006);
Scope of Review, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006). Plaintiffs claimed the Forest Service failed to take a
“hard look” when preparing the EIS and that this would cause potential irreparable harm to national
forests. Kootenai I, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1243. Speciﬁcally, plaintiffs contended the Forest Service (1)
failed to analyze reasonable alternative to the Roadless Rule, (2) the public comment period was
inadequate, and (3) failed to analyze adequately the cumulative impacts of the Roadless Rule. Id.
at 1243-47.
71

See Kootenai II, 313 F.3d 1094, 1104 (9th Cir. 2002).

72

See Kootenai I, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1248.

73

Kootenai II, 313 F.3d at 1107.

74

Id. at 1106-07. The harm would result from the lack of accessibility to prevent “unnaturally
severe wildﬁres, insect infestation and disease.” Id. at 1112.
75

Id. at 1104. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals consolidated the appeals. Id.
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The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals examined whether the plaintiffs
demonstrated a likelihood of success on their NEPA claims.76 The court reviewed
NEPA’s procedural requirements to determine if a preliminary injunction of
the Roadless Rule was appropriate.77 First, the court found the Forest Service
most likely complied with NEPA’s notice and comment procedures.78 Second,
the court found the Forest Service most likely considered a reasonable range of
alternatives in the EIS.79 Therefore, the court found the plaintiffs failed to meet
the preliminary injunction burden; they failed to show probable success on their
NEPA claims.80
In conclusion, the court of appeals rejected the lower court’s holding that
irreparable harm would occur if the Forest Service implemented the Roadless
Rule.81 The court of appeals opined that “restrictions on human intervention are
not usually irreparable in the sense required for injunctive relief.”82 The court held
that promulgation of the Roadless Rule was not likely to violate NEPA and the
lower court “incorrectly applied the ‘possibility of irreparable harm’ standard to
justify an injunction.”83 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the
lower court’s decision.84

76

Id. at 1115. First, the court found that an EIS is required in accordance with NEPA when
a federal action signiﬁcantly affects the human environment, but not when an action “maintain[s]
the environmental status quo.” Id. at 1114; see 40 C.F.R. § 1508.14 (2005) (deﬁning human
environment). The environmental organizations argued that the Roadless Rule did not affect the
human environment, but the Rule “simply amounts to a decision to leave nature alone.” Kootenai
II¸ 313 F.3d at 1115. The court, however, decided the Roadless Rule did trigger an EIS, as human
intervention, or in this case, the lack of intervention would change the environmental status quo.
Id.
77

Kootenai II¸ 313 F.3d at 1115.

78

Id. at 1115-20. Contrary to the lower court’s ﬁnding, the court found the Forest Service
did provide adequate information and public notice concerning the Roadless Rule. Id. at 1116.
Speciﬁcally, the Court found there was actual notice of the areas to be affected, despite an initial
lack of maps of the area. Id. at 1117. The court also found the additional 4.2 million acres of
affected land in the FEIS did not require a supplemental EIS. Id. at 1118. The court also noted
the public had time to comment on the additions. Id. Finally, the court found the Forest Service
provided substantially more time for public comment than required by NEPA. Id. at 1119. The
Forest Service accepted public comments for sixty-nine days, whereas, NEPA only requires a fortyﬁve day comment period. Id. at 1118.
79

Id. at 1120-24. In support, the court determined NEPA does not require the Forest Service
to consider alternatives that directly conﬂict with NEPA’s policy objectives. Id. at 1121. The court
explained by stating that NEPA’s objective “is ﬁrst and foremost to protect the natural environment.”
Id. at 1123.
80

Id.

81

Id. at 1126.

82

Kootenai II¸ 313 F.3d at 1125.

83

Id. at 1126. “[T]he process [of implementing the Roadless Rule] abided the general statutory
requirements of NEPA.” Id.
84

Id.
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Recently, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California,
in California ex rel. Lockyer v. USDA, once again changed the management of
national forest roadless areas.85 In Lockyer, the plaintiffs consisted of four states and
a host of environmental organizations.86 The plaintiffs claimed the USDA violated
NEPA, the Endangered Species Act (ESA), and the APA when it promulgated the
State Petitions Rule.87
To determine whether the promulgation of the State Petitions Rule required
a NEPA analysis, the court addressed whether the Rule constituted a procedural
change or a substantive repeal of the Roadless Rule.88 The court asserted that a
substantive repeal, but not a procedural change, would require a NEPA analysis.89
The court found the State Petitions Rule did substantively repeal the Roadless
Rule because it “eliminated the uniform nationwide protections for roadless
areas.”90 Therefore, NEPA required an EIS for the State Petitions Rule.91
85

See Cal. ex rel. Lockyer v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 459 F. Supp. 2d 874 (N.D. Cal. 2006).

86

Id. at 879. The four states were California, Washington, New Mexico, and Oregon. Id. The
environmental groups were the Wilderness Society, California Wilderness Coalition, Forests Forever
Foundation, Northcoast Environmental Center, Oregon Natural Resources Council Fund, Sitka
Conservation Society, Siskiyou Regional Education Project, Biodiversity Conservation Alliance,
Sierra Club, National Audubon Society, Greater Yellowstone Coalition, Center for Biological
Diversity, Environmental Protection Information Center, Klamath-Siskiyou Wildlands Center,
Defenders of Wildlife, Paciﬁc Rivers Council, Idaho Conservation League, Humane Society of the
United States, Conservation NW and Greenpeace. Id.
87

Id. at 884; see also National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (2006);
Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1539 (2006); Scope of Review, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)
(2006). The plaintiffs claimed the USDA violated NEPA because the Forest Service adopted the
State Petitions Rule “without environmental analysis under NEPA;” the Forest Service did not
prepare an EIS when promulgating the State Petitions Rule. Lockyer, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 881. The
plaintiffs claimed the USDA also failed to engage in the consultation process required by ESA. Id.
The ESA requires the agency to engage in a consultation to insure the agency action “is not likely
to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species.” 16 U.S.C.
§ 1536(a)(2).
88

Lockyer, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 883. The court began its discussion by recognizing the “threshold
that triggers the requirement for NEPA analysis is relatively low.” Id. at 894. To show an analysis
is needed one only needs to prove there are “‘substantial questions whether a project may have
a signiﬁcant effect’ on the environment.” Id. (quoting Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v.
Blackwood, 161 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 1998)).
89

Lockyer, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 883.

90

Id. at 898. The court relied on Andrus v. Sierra Club, a U.S. Supreme Court opinion, to
support the ﬁnding that an EIS was required when the Roadless Rule was repealed. Id. at 899.
Andrus stated if a program is terminated and the termination “‘would signiﬁcantly affect the quality
of the human environment,’” then an EIS is required. Id. (quoting Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S.
347, 393 n.22 (1979)).
91

Lockyer, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 894. A substantive repeal signiﬁed that the Forest Service
implemented a new management plan for roadless areas. Id. When the Forest Service implements a
new management plan, NEPA requires an EIS. Id. “An EIS must be prepared if an agency proposes
to implement a speciﬁc policy, to adopt a plan for a group of related actions, or to implement a
speciﬁc statutory program or executive directive.” Id.
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The court also found the State Petitions Rule itself, not just the repealing
of the Roadless Rule, required an EIS.92 The State Petitions Rule required an
EIS because it was a new management plan for national forest roadless areas.93
“To characterize this shift from uniform national protections for roadless areas to
protections that vary by state as well as by forest as merely procedural would elevate
form over substance and eliminate environmental assessment of this substantial
change.”94 Thus, the court found the State Petitions Rule “substantively effects
the environment” by both repealing the existing rule and by implementing a new
rule.95
In conclusion, the court enjoined the State Petitions Rule and reinstated the
Roadless Rule.96 When discussing this remedy the court stated that “[t]he Ninth
Circuit has explained that ‘the effect of invalidating an agency rule is to reinstate
the rule previously in force.’”97 The court prohibited the USDA from taking any
actions that would violate the Roadless Rule without ﬁrst preparing an EIS.98

92

Id.

93

Id. at 899. Before the Roadless Rule, national forest roadless areas were managed on a forestby-forest level, whereas with the State Petitions Rule the forest may be managed on a state-by-state
level. Id.
For example, a number of national forests and the roadless areas within them cross
state lines . . . Previously, those areas were managed uniformly on both sides of
the state border under the forest plan. At oral argument, Defendants’ counsel
conceded that the Forest Service had not taken a hard look at what would happen if
neighboring states submitted petitions seeking differing treatment of roadless areas
that crossed state borders.
Id. “Similarly, the Forest Service failed to consider what would happen if one state petitioned for
more protection of those roadless areas and the neighboring state did not.” Id.
[T]he Palisades and Winegar Hole roadless areas in the Targhee National Forest
straddle the Idaho-Wyoming border and contain areas in both states where road
construction and reconstruction are not prohibited under the current forest plan.
The State of Idaho, which ﬁled an amicus brief in support of Defendants in this case
and opposed reinstatement of the Roadless Rule, has announced that it will submit
a petition that apparently will not seek to reinstate all the protections it had under
the Roadless Rule . . . while the State of Wyoming has announced that it will not
ﬁle a petition.
Id. at 900 n.5.
94

Id. at 901.

95

Id. at 904. The court also found for the petitioners that the “Forest Service violated ESA by
failing to engage in the consultation process before issuing the State Petitions Rule.” Id. at 912. The
court decided not to address the APA claim, as it already found the State Petitions Rule to violate
NEPA and ESA. Id. at 913.
96

Lockyer, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 919.

97

Id. It is well recognized that when a court invalidates an agency rule, the court has authority
to reinstate the previous rule. See, e.g., Paulson v. Daniels, 413 F.3d 999, 1008 (9th Cir. 2005) (“The
effect of invalidating an agency rule is to reinstate the rule previously in force.”).
98

Lockyer, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 919.
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As these cases demonstrate, the Roadless Rule is controversial and continues
to be a prominent issue in the judicial context.99

C. The Mootness Doctrine
Federal courts are limited to deciding actual cases and controversies.100
The mootness doctrine is applicable if a case or controversy once existed, but
subsequently was resolved prior to the federal court’s judgment.101 If the court
ﬁnds that no case or controversy exists, it may dismiss the case as moot.102 The
Supreme Court, however, has emphasized the mootness doctrine’s ﬂexibility.103
This ﬂexibility is seen in the exceptions to the doctrine.104 Two exceptions are
relevant here—cases capable of repetition, yet evading review and voluntary
cessation.105
A case is not moot when a case or controversy is capable of repetition, yet
evades review.106 A case is not moot, thus reviewable by a federal court, if two
factors are satisﬁed: (1) the challenged issue terminates before full litigation occurs,
and (2) a reasonable expectation exists that the same party will be exposed to the

99

Compare Kootenai I, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1248 (D. Idaho 2001) (granting a preliminary
injunction of the Roadless Rule because the court found a likelihood of success on NEPA claims
and irreparable harm), with Kootenai II, 313 F.3d 1094, 1123 (9th Cir. 2002) (ﬁnding Kootenai I
erroneously granted a preliminary injunction based on the faulty assumption of likelihood of success
on NEPA claims and ﬁnding irreparable harm), and Lockyer, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 919 (repealing the
State Petitions Rule and reinstating the Roadless Rule nationwide); see also Barringer, supra note 3,
at A21(describing the national forest management litigation as “legal Ping-Pong”).
100
Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L. REV. 227, 277 (1990); see also U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 2. The mootness doctrine is based on Article III of the U.S. Constitution, although this
assumption has been debated. Bandes, supra note 100, at 277 (“The Court currently views the
mootness doctrine as grounded, at least in part, in article III concerns. A number of commentators,
recently joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, have questioned this assumption.”).
101
See, e.g., Bandes, supra note 100, at 245; 13A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER &
EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3533.1 (2007).
102

See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 135, 129-30 (Vicki Been et al. eds.,
Aspen Publisher 5th ed. 2007) (“Essentially, any change in the facts that ends the controversy
renders the case moot”). The U.S. Supreme Court has stated “a case is moot when the issues
presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Powell
v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969). Parties to the suit or the court are capable of raising the
issue of mootness. WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 101, at § 3533.1.
103

U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 400 (1980) (noting the “ﬂexible character
of the Art. III mootness doctrine”).
104

There are four exceptions to the mootness doctrine: “‘collateral’ injuries,” “capable of
repetition yet evading review,” voluntary cessation, and “certiﬁed class action suit[s].” CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 102, at 131.
105

See infra notes 106-20 and accompanying text.

106

See, e.g., 5 AM. JUR. 2D Appellate Review § 602 (2007).
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same action in the future.107 This exception allows courts to rule on short duration
issues, which are likely to reoccur, but terminate before or during litigation.108
The other relevant exception to the mootness doctrine is when a party
voluntarily ceases the disputed action, but could resume the action in the future.109
The U.S. Supreme Court, in Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services,
recently stated when a party voluntarily terminates a disputed act the case is moot
only “if subsequent events made it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful
behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.”110 The Court stressed the
party claiming mootness carries a “heavy burden” and must show the contested
actions would not reoccur.111 The case should not be moot if the party fails to
carry this burden.112
The Supreme Court’s decision in City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc.,
demonstrates when a statutory repeal satisﬁes the voluntary cessation exception to
mootness.113 In that case, Aladdin’s Castle sought declaratory and injunctive relief
107

See, e.g., Lewis J. Heisman, Federal Administrative Orders as Subject to Judicial Review Where
Such Orders are “Capable of Repetition, yet Evading Review”, 66 A.L.R. FED 285 (1984).
108
Heisman, supra note 107, at § 1(a). Cases dealing with pregnancy issues are good examples
of how this exception can apply— pregnancy is a temporary condition that usually lasts around
nine to ten months, whereas litigation of a pregnancy issue may require more time. See 5 AM. JUR.
2D Appellate Review § 602; see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973) (“Pregnancy provides
a classic justiﬁcation for a conclusion of nonmootness. It truly could be ‘capable of repetition, yet
evading review.’”).
109
See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 102, at 139; 5 AM. JUR. 2D Appellate Review § 606 (2007);
Walling v. Helmerich & Payne, 323 U.S. 37, 43 (1944) (“Voluntary discontinuance of an alleged
illegal activity does not operate to remove a case from the ambit of judicial power.”); see also U.S.
v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953) (“[V]oluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct
does not deprive the tribunal of power to hear and determine the case, i.e., does not make the case
moot.”). The court does not appear to have discretionary power to avoid applying this exception.
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 102, at 139 (“A case is not to be dismissed as moot if the defendant
voluntarily ceases the allegedly improper behavior but is free to return to it at any time.”) (emphasis
added).
110
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000)
(citing U.S. v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass’n, 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968)) (emphasis added).
In Laidlaw, environmental groups brought suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and civil
penalties against the defendant for violation of the Clean Water Act permit regulations. Laidlaw,
528 U.S. at 167. The Supreme Court found the case not moot even though the defendant had
closed one facility and also changed its behavior to be in compliance with the regulations. Id. at
193. In Laidlaw the Supreme Court found the burden was not met; it was not absolutely clear the
actions would not reoccur, thus, the case was not moot even though the acts had been amended.
Id. at 193.
111
Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 189 (“[The] defendant claiming that its voluntary compliance moots
a case bears the formidable burden of showing that it is absolutely clear the allegedly wrongful
behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.”).
112

Id. at 189; accord CHEMERINSKY, supra note 102, at 139-40.

113

City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283 (1982). A statutory change or
repeal, however, does not always fulﬁll the exception to mootness. See infra note 120.
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against a city ordinance because of a vague phrase in a licensing provision.114 The
district court found the challenged phrase was unconstitutionally vague.115 While
the case was pending on appeal, the City eliminated the challenged phrase from
the ordinance.116 The Supreme Court found “the city’s repeal of the objectionable
language would not preclude it from reenacting precisely the same provision
if the District Court’s judgment were vacated.”117 The Court found the City
failed to carry its burden; it failed to prove there was no reasonable expectation
of reinstatement of the statute.118 Therefore, the Supreme Court held the case
was not moot, but rather the court could proceed to the merits of the case.119
Whether a statutory repeal makes a case moot appears to hinge on the likelihood
of reinstatement of the statute.120

PRINCIPAL CASE
In 2003, the State of Wyoming ﬁled suit against the USDA in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Wyoming.121 Numerous environmental organizations
intervened as defendants.122 Wyoming claimed the USDA violated NEPA, the
Wilderness Act, and other acts when promulgating the Roadless Rule.123 The court
found for Wyoming on ﬁve of its six NEPA claims and its Wilderness Act claim.124
114

Aladdin’s Castle, 455 U.S. at 283.

115

Id.

116

Id.

117

Id. at 289. The court stated that the City changed the provision in response to the lower
court’s decision. Id.
118

Id.

119

Aladdin’s Castle, 455 U.S. at 289.

120

See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 102, at 141-43; compare Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S.
576 (1989) (holding the case was moot when the challenged statute was amended), with Aladdin’s
Castle, 455 U.S. 283 (holding a change in the challenged statute while the case was on appeal does
not moot the case).
121

Wyoming I, 277 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1203 (D. Wyo. 2003).

122

Id. at 1204. Intervenors included Wyoming Outdoor Council, Wilderness Society, Sierra
Club, Biodiversity Associates, Paciﬁc Rivers Council, Natural Resource Defense Council, Defenders
of Wildlife, and National Audubon Society. Id.
123
Id. at 1217. Speciﬁcally, Wyoming claimed the Forest Service violated NEPA for the
following six reasons: (1) failure to provide the public with adequate information during the scoping
period and development of the EIS; (2) denial of cooperating agency status for Wyoming; (3) failure
to consider a reasonable range of alternatives; (4) failure to conduct site speciﬁc analysis; (5) failure
to conduct an adequate cumulative impact analysis; and (6) failure to provide a supplemental EIS.
Id. at 1219-32. In addition, Wyoming claimed the Roadless Rule constituted “a de facto designation
of ‘wilderness’ in contravention of the process established by the Wilderness Act.” Id. at 1232.
Wyoming contended the Roadless Rule created wilderness areas, thus bypassed Congress’s sole
authority to designate wilderness areas. Id. at 1232; see also National Wilderness Preservation System
Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (2006).
124

Wyoming I, 277 F. Supp. 2d at 1231-32, 1235-37. The court agreed with Wyoming on
all of its NEPA claims, except that NEPA required a site speciﬁc analysis. Id. at 1227. Also the
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Since the court found the Roadless Rule violated NEPA and the Wilderness Act,
it decided not to address Wyoming’s remaining claims.125 The U.S. District Court
concluded by ordering a nationwide injunction of the Roadless Rule.126
Although the USDA decided not to appeal the district court’s decision,
environmental organizations—the defendant-intervenors—ﬁled an appeal with
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.127 Because the Forest Service repealed the
Roadless Rule during appellate oral arguments, the court dismissed the case as
moot and vacated the lower court’s decision.128
The court began its discussion of mootness by determining the Roadless Rule
was nonexistent.129 The court stated the Forest Service’s adoption of the State
Petitions Rule rendered the Roadless Rule irrelevant.130 The court stated that in
determining whether an issue is moot, “‘[t]he crucial question is whether granting
a present determination of the issues offered will have some effect in the real
world.’”131 Since the court found the Roadless Rule no longer existed, there was
no need to address the case.132
The court then discussed one exception to the mootness doctrine—a wrong
capable of repetition, yet evading review.133 The court explained this exception
has two prongs.134 An exception exists if the “challenged conduct” is short
court determined that the Roadless Rule violated the Wilderness Act because (1) a roadless area “is
synonymous with the Wilderness Act’s deﬁnition of ‘wilderness,’” (2) the permitted uses of the two
areas were the same, and (3) most of the roadless areas covered by the Roadless Rule were identiﬁed
in a study intended to identify areas to recommend as wilderness. Id. at 1236.
125

Id. at 1237. Although Wyoming properly raised National Forest Management Act and
Multiple-Use and Sustained-Yield Act claims, the court found it was not required to address these
claims after holding the Roadless Rule violated NEPA and the Wilderness Act. Id. The court then
dismissed Wyoming’s other claims under federal statutes because of lack of authoritative support.
Id. at 1237.
126

Id. at 1239. The U.S. District Court for the District of Wyoming found “the Roadless Rule
was promulgated in violation of the National Environmental Policy Act and the Wilderness Act
[and thus was] set aside.” Id. at 1239. The court concluded by ordering a nationwide injunction of
the Roadless Rule. Id.
127

Wyoming II, 414 F.3d 1207, 1211 (10th Cir. 2005).

128

Id. at 1214.

129

Id. at 1212.

130

Id.

131

Id. (quoting Citizens for Responsible Gov’t State Political Action Comm. v. Davidson, 236
F.3d 1174, 1182 (10th Cir. 2000)).
132
Wyoming II, 414 F.3d at 1212. The court reasoned the “alleged procedural deﬁciencies of
the Roadless Rule [were] now irrelevant because the replacement rule was promulgated in a new and
separate rulemaking process.” Id.
133
Id.; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 102, at 135 (explaining the exception to the mootness
doctrine).
134

Wyoming II, 414 F.3d at 1212.
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lived, making litigation during its existence difﬁcult, and if reoccurrence of the
challenged conduct is reasonably expected.135 The court declared neither prong
was met.136 First, the court decided that if the Roadless Rule was reinstated there
would be ample time to litigate the issue.137 Second, the court stated that it would
not speculate as to whether the issue would be relitigated.138 Since the court found
the case failed to satisfy either prong, the court held the case was moot.139
Because the court found the case was moot, it also vacated the judgment of
the lower court.140 The court reasoned that vacating the lower court’s decision
was appropriate because the party bringing the appeal and the party that made
the case moot were not the same.141 The court vacated the lower court’s decision
because mootness was a result of “‘circumstances unattributable to any of the
parties.’”142 The court also found there was an absence of manipulation in the
case, which would forbid a vacatur.143 Thus, the court dismissed the case as moot
and vacated the lower court’s judgment.144

ANALYSIS
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals erroneously determined Wyoming II to
be moot. First, the court should have applied the “voluntary cessation” exception,
allowing the court to rule on the merits of the case.145 Second, public interest in

135

Id. (citing Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 481 (1990) (for exceptions)).

136

Wyoming II, 414 F.3d at 1212.

137

Id. (“[T]here would be ample opportunity to challenge the rule before it ceased to exist.”).
The court, however, did not cite to any authority for this conclusion. Id.
138
Id. The court asserted it would be speculative to conclude Wyoming would be faced with
the Roadless Rule in the future. Id. The court cited to Murphy v. Hunt, a Supreme Court case, to
assert “the possibility of recurrence must be more than theoretical.” Wyoming II, 414 F.3d at 1212;
see Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482-83 (1982).
139

Wyoming II, 414 F.3d at 1212-13. The court did not discuss this exception in detail. See id.
at 1212 (concluding the mootness exceptions did not apply in three sentences).
140

Id. at 1213; see also supra notes 128-39 and accompanying text (discussing why the case was
moot); see supra note 30 (explaining when a vacatur is proper).
141

Wyoming II, 414 F.3d at 1213. The Forest Service was responsible for mooting the case, and
it was not seeking relief from the lower court’s judgment. Id.
142

Id. (quoting U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 23 (1994)).

143

Wyoming II, 414 F.3d at 1213. Vacating is not an option if a party uses it to obtain relief not
afforded through the judicial system. Id. The “instant case [does] not suggest that the Forest Service
was motivated by a desire to avoid or undermine the district court’s ruling.” Id.
144

Id. at 1214.

145

CHEMERINSKY, supra note 102, at 139 (deﬁning the voluntary cessation exception to the
mootness doctrine and citing to relevant cases); see also supra notes 100-20 and accompanying
text.
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national forest roadless area management militated against mootness.146 Third,
judicial economy supported ruling on the merits instead of dismissing the
case.147

A. Exception to the Mootness Doctrine: Voluntary Cessation
Although the Tenth Circuit examined one exception to the mootness
doctrine, it overlooked another applicable exception—voluntary cessation.148 A
court should not dismiss a case “as moot if the defendant voluntarily ceases the
allegedly improper behavior but is free to return to it at any time.”149 As found
in City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., this exception can apply to statutory
repeals.150 The voluntary cessation exception can apply to statutory repeals if there
is a reasonable likelihood that the statute will be reinstated.151
The Tenth Circuit in Wyoming II should have examined the voluntary cessation
exception, focusing its analysis on the possible reinstatement of the Roadless
Rule.152 Although the Forest Service did not repeal the Roadless Rule in response
to litigation, the repeal occurred during oral arguments of Wyoming II.153 Also, but
for the Forest Service’s voluntary repeal, the Tenth Circuit would have ruled on
the merits of the Roadless Rule.154 Once a court establishes the party terminated

146

See U.S. v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953) (“[P]ublic interest in having the
legality of the practices settled, militates against a mootness conclusion,” when there is the possibility
of reoccurrence.); see infra notes 177-83 and accompany text.
147

See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 192
(2000) (ﬁnding when litigation is in an advanced stage, it may be more efﬁcient to decide a case,
not moot it); see infra notes 184-94 and accompany text.
148

See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 102, at 139 (explaining the exception to the mootness
doctrine); 5 AM. JUR. 2D Appellate Review § 606 (2007) (reviewing the effects of “voluntary
acquiescence” of challenged conduct upon mootness).
149
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 102, at 139; W.T. Grant, 345 U.S. at 632 (“[V]oluntary cessation
of allegedly illegal conduct does not deprive the tribunal of power to hear and determine the case,
i.e., does not make the case moot.”); see, e.g., Walling v. Helmerich & Payne, 323 U.S. 37, 43
(1944) (“Voluntary discontinuance of an alleged illegal activity does not operate to remove a case
from the ambit of judicial power.”). In order for this exception to apply there must be a “reasonable
expectation that the wrong will be repeated.” W.T. Grant, 345 U.S. at 633 (citing U.S. v. Aluminum
Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 448 (2d Cir. 1945)).
150
City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289 (1982). The Supreme Court
found “the city’s repeal of the objectionable language [in the statute] would not preclude it from
reenacting precisely the same provision if the District Court’s judgment were vacated.” Id.; see also
16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 169 (2007) (stating that amending or repealing a challenged statute
requires an analysis to determine if the voluntary cessation exception to the mootness doctrine
applies).
151

See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 102, at 141-43.

152

See Wyoming II, 414 F.3d 1207, 1211 (10th Cir. 2005).

153

See id.

154

See id.; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 102, at 141-43.
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the challenged conduct voluntarily, next it must determine the likelihood of the
action reoccurring.155 The Supreme Court’s standard to determine if challenged
conduct is likely to reoccur is whether “events made it absolutely clear that the
allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.”156 Because
of the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Kootenai II, the assured challenge to the State
Petitions Rule, and precedent establishing a court’s remedial authority to reinstate
a prior rule a reasonable likelihood that the Roadless Rule would be reinstated
existed.157
The Kootenai II opinion indicates the Ninth Circuit thought the Roadless Rule
was valid.158 Although the Ninth Circuit in Kootenai II only addressed whether
the plaintiffs presented enough evidence to warrant a preliminary injunction, the
court discussed the petitioners’ NEPA claims in great depth.159 After discussing
the merits of each alleged NEPA violation, the Ninth Circuit opined “it cannot
be said that there is a strong likelihood of success on the merits.”160 The Ninth
Circuit further emphasized its point by stating “it is plain that the Forest Service
gave a ‘hard look’ at the complex problem presented.”161 These statements and the
depth of analysis undertaken by the court reveal that the Ninth Circuit considered
the Roadless Rule valid.162
Although the Ninth Circuit indicated the Roadless Rule was valid, the
adoption of the State Petitions Rule repealed the Roadless Rule.163 The repeal of the
Roadless Rule and implementation of the State Petitions Rule was certain to spark
litigation.164 One newspaper article lucidly stated the State Petitions Rule would
155
See 32A AM. JUR. 2D Federal Courts § 599 (2007) (“Defendants who seek to establish
mootness because of their voluntary discontinuance of allegedly illegal activity must establish that
there is no reasonable likelihood that the wrong will be repeated.”) (emphasis added); 1A C.J.S. Actions
§ 83 (2008) (stating a case is not moot if the termination of the challenged act is “not expected to
be permanent”).
156

Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 203 (2000)
(quoting U.S. v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass’n, 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968)).
157

See, e.g., Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 203; 1A C.J.S. Actions § 83; 32A AM. JUR. 2D Federal Courts

§ 599.
158

See Kootenai II, 313 F.3d 1094, 1115-23 (9th Cir. 2002).

159

Id.

160

Id. at 1123.

161

Id. (emphasis added).

162

See generally id.

163

See Kootenai II, 313 F.3d at 1115-23; State Petitions, 70 Fed. Reg. 25654 (May 13, 2005)
(to be codiﬁed at 36 C.F.R. pt. 294).
164
Note the plethora of newspaper articles devoted to the national forest roadless area
management. See, e.g., Felicity Barringer, Logging and Politics Collide in Idaho, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
9, 2004, at A10 (discussing the “polarizing and ﬁerce” debate between “those who want to make
a proﬁt from federal timberlands and those who want to lock business out”); Editorial, T.R.? He’s
No T.R., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2007, at Section 4 (noting President Bush thwarted “one of the
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“spur a new round of suits by environmentalists.”165 In Wyoming II, the Tenth
Circuit recognized the zealous nature in which roadless area management plans
are litigated.166 When describing the background of the Roadless Rule the court
stated: “Almost immediately, the Roadless Rule was embroiled in litigation.”167
The Tenth Circuit must have foreseen that the adoption of the State Petitions
Rule would cause further litigation of roadless area management plans.168
Since litigation of the State Petitions Rule was inevitable, the Tenth Circuit
should have considered the remedy involved in such litigation and the possible
reinstatement of the Roadless Rule.169 Many circuits have precedent declaring
that when a court invalidates an agency rule, the court has authority to reinstate
the previous rule.170 Although the Tenth Circuit lacks binding precedent for

most important acts of environmental stewardship in many years, Mr. Clinton’s roadless rule.”);
Editorial, The Roadless Rule Takes a New Turn, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2006 at A24 (discussing the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California’s ruling to reinstate the Roadless Rule);
see Juliet Eilperin, Roadless Rules for Forests Set Aside: USDA Plans to Reverse Clinton Prohibitions,
WASH. POST, July 13, 2004 at A1 (writing about the Bush Administration’s proposal to replace the
Roadless Rule); Jeff Gearino, Roadless Rule Affects State, CASPER STAR TRIBUNE, May 5, 2005 (noting
there are many different opinions about national forest roadless area management); Bill Marsh, The
Nation; Where the Human Footprint is the Lightest, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2005, at Section 4 (noting
where the “last of the truly wild” places are located and the dispute surrounding management of
these roadless areas); Karl Puckett, Roadless Rule: State of Montana Backs Clinton-era Protection,
GREAT FALLS TRIBUNE, Oct. 8, 2007 (discussing the debate surrounding national forest roadless
area management); Whitney Royster, Roadless Rule Puzzles Governor, CASPER STAR TRIBUNE, Aug. 6,
2004 (discussing the implications of the State Petitions Rule); Garren Stauffer, Still No Resolution
on Roadless Rule, LARAMIE BOOMERANG, Oct. 20, 2007 (discussing the “hot-button issue” of national
forest roadless areas).
165

See, e.g., Eilperin, supra note 164, at A1.

166

Wyoming II, 414 F.3d 1207, 1211 (10th Cir. 2005) (mentioning Kootenai II and Wyoming
I, which reached different conclusions about the merits of the Roadless Rule).
167

Id. (emphasis added).

168

It is fair to say the court knew litigation was inevitable because even newspapers foresaw it.
See, e.g., Eilperin, supra note 164, at A1. Petitioners ﬁled a complaint for declaratory and injunctive
relief from the State Petitions Rule on August 30, 2005, about seven weeks after the Tenth Circuit
decided Wyoming II. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 17, Cal. ex rel. Lockyer
v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 459 F. Supp. 2d 874 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (No. 05-cv-04038-EDL).
169

See Lockyer, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 919.

170

See, e.g., id.; Paulson v. Daniels, 413 F.3d 999, 1008 (9th Cir. 2005) (“The effect of
invalidating an agency rule is to reinstate the rule previously in force.”); Int’l Snowmobile Mfrs.
Ass’n v. Norton, 340 F. Supp. 2d 1249, 1257 (D. Wyo. 2004) (ﬁnding that a judgment on the
validity of a rule must be made when there exists potential for reinstatement); Bedford County
Mem’l Hosp. v. Health & Human Servs., 769 F.2d 1017, 1024 (4th Cir. 1985) (“Hence we ﬁnd
that the appropriate relief . . . is to remand for entry of decrees directing payment forthwith under
the old overhead formula.”); Menorah Med. Ctr. v. Heckler, 768 F.2d 292, 297 (8th Cir. 1985)
(“Unless special circumstances are present, which we do not ﬁnd here, prior regulations remain valid
until replaced by a valid regulation or invalidated by a court.”); Lloyd Noland Hosp. & Clinic v.
Heckler, 762 F.2d 1561, 1569 (11th Cir. 1985) (“The effect [of invalidating the malpractice rule]
was to reinstate the prior method of reimbursement.”); Abington Mem’l Hosp. v. Heckler, 750
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such authority, the court should have considered the practice in other circuits. 171
Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit could have predicted that when selecting a forum
to challenge the State Petitions Rule, supporters of the Roadless Rule would select
a forum likely to give a judgment in their favor. 172 Speciﬁcally, future petitioners
were likely to ﬁle suit in a forum where invalidation of the current rule allowed
the court to reinstate the prior rule—the Roadless Rule.173 Thus, at the time of
the Tenth Circuit’s ruling, there existed a reasonable probability that the Roadless
Rule would be reinstated through State Petitions Rule litigation.174
When looked at together the Ninth Circuit’s approval of the Roadless Rule,
the certain challenge to the State Petitions Rule, and precedent allowing courts
to reinstate a prior rule, it appears the burden on the Forest Service—to show
there was no reasonable expectation of reinstatement—was not met.175 Thus,
because the Forest Service voluntarily repealed the Roadless Rule and a reasonable
likelihood of a court reinstating the Rule existed, Wyoming II satisﬁes the voluntary
cessations exception to the mootness doctrine.176

F.2d 242, 244 (3d Cir. 1984) (“Thus, until rendered invalid by a court decision or replaced by a
valid new regulation, the prior method of reimbursement remains operative.”); Action on Smoking
& Health v. C.A.B., 713 F.2d 795, 797 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (“Thus, by vacating or rescinding the
rescissions proposed by ER-1245, the judgment of this court had the effect of reinstating the rules
previously in force.”).
171
Although not binding precedent, in International Snowmobile Manufacturers Association v.
Norton the U.S. District Court for the District of Wyoming recognized the authority to reinstate
a prior rule. Int’l Snowmobile Mfrs. Ass’n v. Norton, 340 F. Supp. 2d at 1257 (“[N]ew rules and
regulations implemented by the [National Park Service] could be found invalid and as a default, the
[previous rule] would be reimplemented.”).
172
Undeniably the Tenth Circuit is aware of forum shopping. See, e.g., JAMES R. PRATT, III
& BRUCE J. MCKEE, ATLA’S LITIGATING TORT CASES § 3:2 (Roxanne Barton Conlin & Gregory S.
Cusimano eds., 2007) (“[T]he plaintiff ’s attorney must give the utmost attention to all the possible
forum selection factors in order to pick the forum that will probably best favor the plaintiff.”).
173
See Lockyer, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 874. The Lockyer complaint requested relief in the form
of “enjoin[ing] defendants from approving any actions inconsistent with the Roadless Rule.”
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 16, Cal. ex rel. Lockyer v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric.,
459 F. Supp. 2d 874 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (No. 05-cv-04038-EDL).
174

See supra notes 157-73 and accompanying text.

175

Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000)
(“[The] defendant claiming that its voluntary compliance moots a case bears the formidable burden
of showing that it is absolutely clear the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be
expected to recur.”); see 1A C.J.S. Actions § 83 (2008) (“In actions which challenge a government
practice, mootness is obviated where a probability of the recurrence of the practice is coupled with
a certainty that the impact of the recurrence will fall on the litigants before the court.”); Daniel
Steuer, Another Brick in the Wall: Attorney’s Fees for the Civil Rights Litigant After Buckhannon,
11 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 53, 63 (2004) (“[A] case would not be declared moot if some
indication existed that the defendant might reinstate the challenged practice”). Although a factor in
the court’s decision, a party’s stated intent not to reinstate a rule is not sufﬁcient evidence to prove
the challenged conduct will not be repeated. Steuer, supra note 175, at 64.
176

See supra notes 148-75 and accompanying text.
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B. Public Interest
In addition to the voluntary cessation exception to the mootness doctrine,
public interest in the adjudication of the Roadless Rule’s validity supported a
conclusion to not moot the case.177 Courts can decide issues of great public
interest if it is likely the controversy will occur again in the future.178 The U.S.
Supreme Court has stated “public interest in having the legality of the practices
settled, militates against a mootness conclusion.”179 National forest roadless area
management has proven itself an issue of great public interest.180 The Kootenai II
court identiﬁed the public interest when it stated, “in a case such as this one where
the purpose of the challenged action is to beneﬁt the environment, the public’s
interest in preserving precious, unreplenishable resources must be taken into

177

See, e.g., Foster V. Carson, The Ninth Circuit Misapplies the Capable-of-Repetition-YetEvading-Review Exception to the Mootness Doctrine and Lends a Free Hand to Budget-Cutting State
Ofﬁcials, 79 WASH. L. REV. 665, 668 (2004) (“Federal courts do not recognize an exception to
mootness for cases involving a strong public interest. However, both the U.S. Supreme Court and
the Ninth Circuit have held that a strong public interest in settling the legality of an action may
weigh against a holding of mootness.”); Steuer, supra note 175, at 64 (stating strong public interest
in having an issue decided adds to the consideration of mootness). Additional support that the court
should not have mooted the case because of public interest comes from its own citations. Wyoming
II, 414 F.3d 1207, 1212 (10th Cir. 2005). The U.S. District Court for the District of Wyoming
cites to Camﬁeld v. Oklahoma City, to support its conclusion of mootness, by paraphrasing Camﬁeld
to conclude “that, without more, the possibility that a legislature may reenact the challenged statute
does not preclude a mootness determination.” Id.; Camﬁeld v. Okla. City, 248 F.3d 1214, 1223-24
(10th Cir. 2001). Public interest, however, can be the “more” needed to “preclude a mootness
determination.” See Wyoming II, 414 F.3d at 1212; see also Carson, supra note 177, at 668 (stating,
although not dispositive, public interest can mitigate a mootness conclusion).
178
Public interest is distinct from the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to
mootness, because public interest does not require the litigation to involve the same parties. See 5
AM. JUR. 2D Appellate Review § 604 (2007); see also supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text; see,
e.g., U.S. v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953) (citing U.S. v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass’n, 166
U.S. 309, 309, 310 (1897) (stating “[t]he defendant is free to return to his old ways. This, together
with a public interest in having the legality of the practices settled, militates against a mootness
conclusion.”); Alton & S. Ry. Co. v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 463 F.2d 872,
878 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“[T]he court continues an appeal in existence . . . when the court discerns a
likelihood of recurrence of the same issue, generally in the framework of a ‘continuing’ or ‘recurring’
controversy, and ‘public interest’ in maintaining the appeal.”) (emphasis added); Boise City Irrigation
& Land Co. v. Clark, 131 F. 415, 419 (9th Cir. 1904) (“[T]he courts have entertained and decided
such cases heretofore . . . partly because of the necessity or propriety of deciding some question of
law presented which might serve to guide the municipal body when again called upon to act in the
matter.”).
179

W.T. Grant, 345 U.S. at 632.

180

See generally Wyoming I, 277 F. Supp. 2d 1197 (D. Wyo. 2003); Wyoming II, 414 F.3d
1207; Kootenai I, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1231 (D. Idaho 2001); Kootenai II, 313 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir.
2002); Cal. ex rel. Lockyer v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 459 F. Supp. 2d 874 (N.D. Cal. 2006); see also
supra note 164 (listing newspaper articles addressing national forest roadless area management).
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account.”181 The extensive litigation demonstrates the overriding public interest
“in preserving . . . national forests in their natural state.”182 Thus, combined
with the voluntary cessation exception to the mootness doctrine, the strong
public interest concerning national forest roadless area management should have
persuaded the Tenth Circuit to rule on the issues presented in Wyoming II.183

C. Judicial Economy
Finally, the theory of judicial economy also supported a decision not to
moot Wyoming II.184 A court’s inquiry “into the possibility of future recurrence
of a dispute may conserve the judicial machinery by anticipating future litigation
through the state and federal court systems. Under such circumstances, ﬁnding
a case not moot may advance judicial economy.”185 The reasonable probability of
the Roadless Rule being reinstated supported ruling on Wyoming II to enhance
judicial economy.186

181
Kootenai II, 313 F.3d at 1125. The court continued by stating: “The district court in our
view failed adequately to weigh the public interest in preserving our national forests in their natural
state.” Id.
182
Id. “As evidenced by this litigation, a number of states and environmental organizations
consider the environmental protections of roadless areas repealed by the State Petitions Rule to be
vital to the public interest.” Lockyer, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 914; see also Wyoming II, 414 F.3d at 1214
(holding the Roadless Rule case to be moot); Kootenai II, 313 F.3d at 1123 (holding the district
court erroneously granted a preliminary injunction of the Roadless Rule); Lockyer, 459 F. Supp. 2d
at 919 (holding the State Petitions Rule is to be set aside, reinstating the Roadless Rule); Wyoming I,
277 F. Supp. 2d at 1239 (holding the Roadless Rule invalid, thus granting a permanent nationwide
injunction of the rule); Kootenai I, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1248 (holding a likelihood of success on
claims, thus granting a preliminary injunction of the Roadless Rule ); see also Ben Neary, Wyoming
Judge to Hold Hearing on Roadless Rule, CASPER STAR TRIBUNE (May 24, 2007). The Roadless Rule
hearing was scheduled for Oct. 19, 2007 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Wyoming in
front of Judge Brimmer. Id.
183
See, e.g., Steuer, supra note 175, at 64; W.T. Grant, 345 U.S. at 632 (citing U.S. v. Trans-Mo.
Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 309, 310 (1897) (stating “[t]he defendant is free to return to his old
ways. This, together with a public interest in having the legality of the practices settled, militates
against a mootness conclusion.”)).
184

See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167,
192 (2000) (“[B]y the time mootness is an issue, the case has been brought and litigated, often . . .
for years. To abandon the case at an advanced stage may prove more wasteful than frugal.”); Note,
Mootness on Appeal in the Supreme Court, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1672, 1675 (1970).
185
Mootness on Appeal in the Supreme Court, supra note 184, at 1675 (emphasis in original);
accord Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 192 (“[B]y the time mootness is an issue, the case has been brought and
litigated, often . . . for years. To abandon the case at an advanced stage may prove more wasteful
than frugal.”).
186
See supra notes 157-76 and accompanying text; Mootness on Appeal in the Supreme Court,
supra note 184, at 1675. The State of Wyoming has ﬁled new litigation, consisting of the same
Roadless Rule claims as brought in Wyoming I in U.S. District Court for the District of Wyoming.
See Neary, supra note 182.
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The Tenth Circuit could have conserved judicial resources by deciding the
validity of the Roadless Rule when it was ﬁrst on appeal to the court.187 If the
Tenth Circuit had invalidated the Roadless Rule, then the Lockyer court might
have adjusted its remedy, not reinstating the Roadless Rule.188 If the Tenth Circuit
had ruled the Roadless Rule was valid, the ruling would have added credibility
to the Lockyer remedy of reinstating the Roadless Rule.189 In both situations, a
ruling by the Tenth Circuit would have barred the State of Wyoming from ﬁling
the current lawsuit challenging the Roadless Rule.190 Instead, the Tenth Circuit’s
decision to moot the case necessitated repeat litigation of the same Roadless Rule
claims in the U.S. District Court for the District of Wyoming.191 Because that
court had ruled on the same claims in 2003, it is highly likely to again invalidate
the Roadless Rule.192 In response to the court’s likely ruling, proponents of the
Roadless Rule will, for the second time, appeal to the Tenth Circuit.193 A decision
by the Tenth Circuit in Wyoming II would have avoided this second round of
Roadless Rule litigation in the U.S. District Court for the District of Wyoming
and the Tenth Circuit.194

CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals erroneously determined Wyoming II to
be moot.195 In its opinion the court ignored the voluntary cessation exception to
mootness, which appears to be applicable.196 Furthermore, both public interest
and judicial economy militated against mooting the case.197 A Tenth Circuit
decision about the validity of the Roadless Rule would have added guidance and

187

See, e.g., Mootness on Appeal in the Supreme Court, supra note 184, at 1675.

188

See also Cal. ex rel. Lockyer v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 459 F. Supp. 2d 874, 919 (N.D. Cal.

2006).
189

See id.

190

Hearing held on Oct. 19, 2007 in front of Judge Brimmer, U.S. District Court for the
District of Wyoming. See Neary, supra note 182.
191
Stauffer, supra note 164 (stating: “[Judge] Brimmer already has ruled against the federal
government regarding the [Roadless R]ule. Another judge, in a different jurisdiction, has since
re-instated the rule.”).
192
See Wyoming I, 277 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1239 (D. Wyo. 2003) (holding the Roadless Rule
invalid because of NEPA and Wilderness Act violations).
193

See generally Wyoming II, 414 F.3d 1207 (10th Cir. 2005).

194

Mootness on Appeal in the Supreme Court, supra note 184, at 1675 (“The inquiry into the
possibility of future recurrence of a dispute may conserve the judicial machinery by anticipating
future litigation through the state and federal court systems. Under such circumstances, ﬁnding a
case not moot may advance judicial economy.”).
195

See supra notes 145-91 and accompanying text.

196

See supra notes 148-76 and accompanying text.

197

See supra notes 177-94 and accompanying text.
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boundaries to subsequent roadless area management plan litigation.198 Deciding
the issue to be moot, however, the Tenth Circuit avoided making a decision that
would have national ramiﬁcations.199
Because the mootness doctrine appears to be ﬂexible, when a court is faced
with the issue of mootness, the court must examine all relevant aspects of the case,
including exceptions to mootness, public interest, and judicial economy.200 Only
by reviewing all applicable aspects can a court make an informed, just decision.
But, if a court dismisses a case as moot without a full analysis, the decision can
subject the judicial system and the public to a continuing cycle of unresolved
litigation. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals’ Wyoming II opinion did just
that; the court’s brief and superﬁcial analysis of the mootness doctrine and its
failure to consider public interest and judicial economy has spurred unnecessary,
repetitive litigation, contributing to the unpredictable future of national forest
roadless areas.201 Courts can avoid similar situations by using the ﬂexibility of the
mootness doctrine to rule on a case, instead of simply using the doctrine as a tool
to dismiss a case.

198
See supra notes 187-90. Hearing held on Oct. 19, 2007 in front of Judge Brimmer, U.S.
District Court for the District of Wyoming. Neary, supra note 182; Boise City Irrigation & Land
Co. v. Clark, 131 F. 415, 419 (9th Cir. 1904) (“[T]he courts have entertained and decided such cases
heretofore . . . partly because of the necessity or propriety of deciding some question of law presented
which might serve to guide the municipal body when again called upon to act in the matter.”) (emphasis
added); see also Cal. ex rel. Lockyer v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 459 F. Supp. 2d 874 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
199
The State of Wyoming and the nation appear to be split on how national forest roadless
areas should be managed: Should management be a federal, state, or forest-by-forest plan? No matter
which plan is adopted, having a long-term management plan will allow states, counties, citizens, and
industry to distinguish what activities are and are not allowed in roadless areas. Currently, however,
permissible activities in roadless areas are unpredictable. Although the Lockyer court reinstated the
roadless rule, it is very probable that the U.S. District Court for the District of Wyoming will hold
the Roadless Rule to be invalid. See Lockyer, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 919; see generally Wyoming I, 277 F.
Supp. 2d 1197 (D. Wyo. 2003) (stating Judge Brimmer’s conclusions about the Roadless Rule). The
Forest Service will be stuck between a rock and a hard place, as one court prohibited it from doing
anything contrary to the roadless rule, while the other will probably hold the Rule to be invalid.
Compare Lockyer, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 919, with Wyoming I, 277 F. Supp. 2d at 1239. Thus it will
be hard for the Forest Service to avoid contempt of court orders, as it will have two diametrically
opposed orders.
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U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 400-01 (1980) (stating “the ﬂexible
character of the Art. III mootness doctrine”).
201
See Wyoming II, 414 F.3d 1207, 1211-13 (10th Cir. 2005). The Tenth Circuit only
examined one exception to the mootness doctrine. Id. Additionally, the court failed to analyze
public interest and judicial economy as each relates to the mootness doctrine. Id.; see also supra notes
127-44, 177-94, 199 and accompanying text.
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